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Schess, Esq.: Then and Now: How Technology has Changed the Workplace

THEN AND NOW:
HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED THE
WORKPLACE
Nancy B. Schess, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
When this law journal's first issue was published in 1983, the
workplace was, technologically speaking, a very different place. There
was no e-mail,' no texting, and no instant messaging.3 While some
workplaces maintained central mainframe computers, there were no
laptops, or tablets and precious few personal computers. There were no
personal data assistants (PDAs) or smart phones.5 There was no Internet

* Nancy B. Schess, Esq. is a partner in the law firm of Klein Zelman Rothermel LLP, a
boutique firm representing management in all aspects of labor and employment law located in
Manhattan. She is grateful to her colleagues Charles Caranicas, Esq., Jesse Grasty, Esq. and
Caroline Bishop, Esq., associates with the firm, for their significant work and substantive
contribution to this article.
1. While the first e-mail can be traced back to 1971, e-mail communication as we know it
today did not come into existence until 1996, when free internet e-mail became available. Sarah
Left,
Email
Timeline,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
13,
2002),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2002/mar/13/intemetnews.
2. Chris Gayomali, The Text Message Turns 20: A Brief History of SMS, THE WEEK (Dec.
3, 2012), http://www.theweek.com/article/index/237240/the-text-message-tums-20-a-brief-historyof-sms.
3. Jeff Tyson & Alison Cooper, How Instant Messaging Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/e-mail-messaging/instant-messaging.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2013).
4. See Indicators2000 - Chapter9: Significance of Information Technologies - IT and the
Citizen, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind00/frames.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2013); see also Tracy V. Wilson & Robert Valdes, How Laptops Work, How STUFF
WORKS, http://www.howstuffworks.com/laptop6.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2013); John Markoff,
Microsoft Brings in Top Talent to Pursue Old Goal: The Tablet, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/30/business/microsoft-brings-in-top-talent-to-pursue-old-goalthe-tablet.html.
5. Harry
McCracken,
Newton,
Reconsidered, TIME
(June
1,
2012),
http://www.techland.time.com/2012/06/01/newton-reconsidered/; see Brad McCarty, The History of
the Smartphone, NEXT WEB (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.thenextweb.com/mobile/2011/12/06/thehistory-of-the-smartphone/.
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as we know it today, no social media (e.g. Facebook, Linkedln), and no
tweeting.6 For the legal profession, computerized research had entered
the workplace but only on dedicated terminals.
The business world communicated by landline telephone, by mail
or in person. Even facsimile transmissions and voice mail (or answering
machines) were relatively new phenomena and were not readily
available in all workplaces. Telecommuting was rare and the end of the
workday had clearer delineation since taking work home required
advance planning and often permission.
As technological advances have come into the workplace and
become commonly used, they have challenged existing legal principles
requiring the re-examination of traditional rules regulating workplace
behavior. In this article we will discuss four areas of law which have
adapted, and continue to adapt, to embrace workplace changes
occasioned by new technology; specifically: a) wage and hour
compliance; b) liability issues in discrimination and harassment cases; c)
employee privacy protections; and d) the lawful scope of employer
policies restricting social media communications. In each of these areas,
employers are now compelled to look critically at how technology
impacts their workplace and the legal principles that create the
roadmaps, as well as liabilities associated with those technologies.
II. THE CHANGING BORDERS OF THE WORKPLACE: WAGE
AND HOUR COMPLIANCE
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") governs how employees in
American workplaces must be paid. 7 Of particular relevance here,
employees who are not exempt from coverage (i.e. "non-exempt") must
be paid no less than minimum wage for "hours worked" in a week up
through forty and at least one-and-one-half times that rate for hours
worked over forty.8 Only workers who fall into particular categories,
6. See Dr. Anthony Curtis, The BriefHistory of Social Media, U. OF N.C. AT PEMBROKE,
http://www.uncp.edu/home/acurtis/NewMedia/SocialMedia/SocialMediaHistory.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006). Corollary state laws
7.
similarly regulate compensation in the workplace. See e.g. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 1 199. (McKinney
2009).
8. This rule applies both under federal and New York state law. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207;
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, §§ 141-1.3, 141-1.4, 142-2.1,
142-2.2, 142-3.1, 142-3.2, 146-1.2 and 146-1.4 (Supp. 12013). Some states require overtime pay in
other circumstances. For instance, California requires that work in excess of eight hours in a
workday be compensated at the rate of at least one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay and
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such as executives, administrative employees and professionals as
defined by law (i.e. "exempt"), need not be paid overtime for hours
worked over forty.9 Moreover, the law requires detailed recordkeeping
of hours worked to ensure that non-exempt employees are paid
correctly.o
Violation of wage and hour laws brings significant remedies, which
include liquidated damages and attorneys' fees." There can also be
personal liability associated with failure to pay wages.12 Moreover,
that work in excess of twelve hours in a workday be compensated at the rate of at least double the
regular rate of pay. CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2011).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 213; see 29 C.F.R. § 541.0 (2012); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 12, §§ 141-3.2, 142-2.14, 142-3.12, and 146-3.2.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a) (2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 195(4), 661 (2011).
Notably, the FLSA does not distinguish between work performed at the office and work performed
at home. 29 C.F.R. § 785.12 (2011). Thus, an employer's obligation to keep accurate records of
hours worked is the same, regardless of where the work is performed. See id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). If the employer's violation is deemed willfil, the FLSA provides a
three-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1998). Violations are willful "if the employer
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by [a
statute]." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985). Where the violation is
not willful the statute of limitations is two years. 29 U.S.C. §255(a). The FLSA provides
employees with additional remedies, including liquidated damages up to 100% of the unpaid wages,
attorneys' fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216. Willful violators may also be prosecuted criminally and
fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to six months. Id. §216(a). Employers who willfully or
repeatedly violate the minimum wage or overtime pay requirements are also subject to civil money
penalties of up to $1,100 per violation. Id. §216(e)(2) (Supp. 2012).
New York Labor Law similarly provides for up to 100% liquidated damages as well as attorneys'
fees. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (2011). Moreover, New York Labor Law allows employees to
recover unpaid wages for the six years preceding the commencement of their lawsuit. Id. § 198(3).
New York Labor Law also provides civil penalties of $500 for each violation and criminal penalties
ranging from $500 to $20,000, as well as imprisonment for up to a year. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 197,
198-a (2011).
12. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW, § 630 (McKinney 2003) (imposing individual liability for
unpaid wages on the ten largest shareholders of privately held New York corporations). Under the
FLSA, "employer" is defined to include "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). "The Supreme Court has
emphasized the 'expansiveness' of the FLSA's definition of employer." Herman v. RSR Security
Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973)).
In determining whether an individual is an employer, "the overarching concern is whether the
alleged employer possessed the power to control the workers in question, with an eye to the
'economic reality' presented by the facts of each case." Id. (citations omitted). This broad
definition of "employer" does not require an ownership interest in the employer entity for individual
liability to attach. It includes corporate officers with operational control of the employer, Chan v.
Sung Yue Tung Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6048, 2007 WL 313483, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2007) (quoting
Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)), as well as non-officer
managers/supervisors. See e.g., Mendez v. Pizza on Stone, LLC, 2012 WL 3133522 (S.D.N.Y.
August 1, 2012); "The Supreme Court has emphasized the 'expansiveness' of the FLSA's definition
of employer." Herman v. RSR Security Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Falk
v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973)). In determining whether an individual is an employer, "the
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wage and hour cases are often easily articulated as collective and class
actions under federal and state law, respectively.13 Taking these ever
increasing penalties into account, employers are wise to understand how
to pay their employees in compliance with applicable law.
Yet, with the advent of modern technology the edges of
compensable "hours worked" have blurred. PDAs, cell phones, laptops
and programs that connect home and work computers have changed the
traditional workspace since work can now easily be performed outside
the physical office, which has increased opportunities for legally
compensable time.
A. After Hours "Off the Clock" Communications
While technology that permits easy access to the office may
arguably make the workplace more productive, it also exposes
employers to potential liability for "off-the-clock" work performed by
non-exempt employees. For example, when a non-exempt employee
reads and responds to work e-mails or revises a document on his home
computer after regular work hours have ended, the work may be
compensable. 14
Under the FLSA, non-exempt employees who take on after-hours
work through such electronic connections generally must be paid for
their time, so long as it is more than de minimis." Whether an employer
overarching concern is whether the alleged employer possessed the power to control the workers in
question, with an eye to the 'economic reality' presented by the facts of each case." Id. (citations
omitted). This broad definition of "employer" does not require an ownership interest in the
employer entity for individual liability to attach. It includes corporate officers with operational
control of the employer, Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6048, 2007 WL 313483, *12
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2007) (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)), as well
as non-officer managers/supervisors. See e.g., Mendez v. Pizza on Stone, LLC, 2012 WL 3133522
(S.D.N.Y. August 1, 2012).
13. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; 29 U.S.C. § 216; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(McKinney 2005). The first
quarter of 2010 saw 1,844 wage and hour class actions, setting a pace for 25% more wage and hour
class actions than 2009, which saw 40% more than 2008. Gary Mathiason & SoRelle B. Brown,
Avoiding Class-Actions and Winning in Court, HUM. RES. ExEc. ONLINE (June 16, 2010),
http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=453896146.
14. Karla Grossenbacher, ElectronicHandheld Devices, Can You Give Them to Non-Exempt
(June
2012),
LAW
STRATEGIST
Employees?
EMP.
http://www.seyfarth.com/dir-docs/publications/GrossenbachrLJN.pdf.
15.
When an FLSA claim "concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the
scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded." Lewis v. Keiser Sch., Inc., No. 1162176-Civ, 2012 WL 4854724, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946)). "Most courts have found daily periods of approximately 10
minutes to be de minimis." Id. (quoting Burks v. Equity Group-Eufaula Div., LLC 571 F. Supp.2d
1235, 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2008).
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must pay technically turns on whether or not the employer knew or
should have known that the employee was performing the work.16
In the context of electronic communications, it is not difficult to
cross the line to dangerous employer knowledge. For example, in an
effort to be efficient, a supervisor sends an email to his non-exempt
subordinate after hours asking about the status of a project. The
subordinate, in an effort to be responsive, answers the email providing
an update on the work. While the responsive email may have taken only
a few minutes to compose, the subordinate spends some time reviewing
emails so that his response is accurate. While efficient as to the work
performed, this scenario can create compensable time, even where the
supervisor may not have actually known that the subordinate was going
to check emails to provide a response to his question but perhaps should
have known that he would do so. Moreover, consider whether the
employee truly understands that he should be reporting this time worked
on his timecard for the week.
Similarly, consider the scenario where a dedicated staff member
chooses on her own to check email after dinner from her home computer
and responds to several requests for information that she was not able to
complete during the day. While she was not asked to do so, the manager
receiving her emails-which clearly show the time when the work was
performed-gratefully acknowledges and accepts her work product.
Where employees communicate with and about work after hours,
employers who do not pay face the risk of litigation.17 When the
employer accepts the work product, the law will assume that it knew the
16. See Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 2008); Davis v. Food
Lion, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986); Forrester v. Roth's I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413,
414 (9th Cir. 1981); 29 U.S.C. § 203(g); Grossenbacher, supranote 14.
17. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Chi., No. 10 C 3183, 2011 WL 941383, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
15, 2011) class cert. granted,No. 10 C 3183, 2013 WL 146389 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2013), (denying a
motion to dismiss when a police sergeant sued the City of Chicago alleging that he was owed
overtime because he spent time checking email and responding to other electronic communications
while off duty); Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of employer and holding that, despite the fact that employee had
improperly filled out his timesheets, he had raised a triable issue of fact with respect to his claimed
overtime hours, including hours worked from home, checking and responding to voicemails and
emails, printing and reviewing sales reports and organizing materials); Zulauf v. Amerisave Mortg.
Corp., 1:11-CV-1784-WSD, 2012 WL 5987860, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 29- 2012) (alleging plaintiffs
were not paid for overtime when they routinely worked more than 40 hours per week, including
time spent using their phones and other devices to respond to emails and calls; the court granted
defendant's motion to decertify the class, finding a lack of commonality amongst the plaintiffs); see
Laura L. Ho, Briana Cummings & Ellen C. Kerns, Hot Topics in Federaland State Wage and Hour
Litigation, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE OBAMA YEARS AT MID-TERM

433, 451 (2011),
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work was being performed and, therefore, the employee must be
compensated." Notably, the device itself will often provide a record of
the fact that the work was done after hours.' 9
In order to head off such risks, employers should create policies
about after hours work and clearly communicate those policies to
employees. Furthermore, employers should make sure to train nonexempt staff in addition to its well-meaning but potentially liability
creating managers about the importance of complying with the rules.
For example, some employers have implemented "no technology after
hours" policies. 20 Furthermore, some employers have gone so far as to
prevent their servers from sending messages to employees outside of
work hours, although lifestyle issues have also driven such policies.2 1
Notably, if an employer maintains a general policy of prohibiting
employees from working overtime without management approval, it is
important to communicate that after hours work requires the same
approval.22
In all cases, employees must be instructed that any after-hours work
must be reported and the employer's record keeping procedures should
18. 29 C.F.R. § 785.13 (2011) ("it is the duty of the management to exercise its control and
see that the work is not performed if it does not want it to be performed. It cannot sit back and
accept the benefits without compensating for them."); see, e.g., Brennan v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (D. Minn. 2010); Berrios v. Nicholas Zito Racing Stable, Inc 849 F.
Supp. 2d 372, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). But see, e.g., Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 17778 (7th Cir. 2011). According to some commentators, even the very issuance of a handheld device
or laptop to a non-exempt employee could support an argument that the employer intended that the
employee read and respond to e-mails after hours. See, e.g., Grossenbacher,supranote 14.
19. See generallyAllen, 2011 WL 941383, at *1.
20. For example, the Atlanta-based shipping company PBD Worldwide has implemented a
nights-free and weekends-free e-mail policy, and the Washington D.C. consulting firm The
Advisory Board Company recently instructed its employees to stay off work e-mail during nonwork hours. Cecilia Kang, Firms Tell Employees: Avoid After Hours E-mail, WASH. POST, (Sept.
21, 2012), http://www.articles.washintponpost.com/2012-09-21/business/35497074_1e-mail-workculture-balckberrys.
21. For its employees in Germany, Volkswagen servers "stop routing emails 30 minutes after
the end of employees' shifts, and then start again 30 minutes before they return to work."
Volkswagen Turns Off Blackberry Email After Work Hours, BBC NEWS: TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 23,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16314901. The French technology firm Atos even
reported plans to end e-mail altogether. "Managers had been wasting five to 20 hours a week just
reading and responding to e-mail, the firm said. Instead, it will use instant messaging and other
tools to communicate among staff." Kang, supra note 20.
22. Even if an employee works without approval however, the work must be paid for if the
employer knew or had reason to know the work was performed. See Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc.,
514 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 2008); Reich v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 400, 407 (8th Cir. 1997); Forrester v.
Roth's IG.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1981); Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d
1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975) ("The employer who wishes no such work to be done has a duty to see it
is not performed."); 29 C.F.R. § 785.13.
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be adapted to be able to record such work.23 This process is not only
legally required but also provides some mechanism for employers to
monitor work being performed outside of the ordinary workday.24
Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Labor has created an "app" for
handheld devices designed to help employees independently track hours
worked.25
B. On Call Employees

Pursuant to the FLSA, under certain circumstances, employees
must be paid for "on call" time.26 The proper inquiry for determining
whether employees must be paid for "on call" work under the FLSA is
"whether the employee is so restricted [during on-call hours] that he is
effectively engaged to wait."27 One of two predominant factors to be
considered is "the degree to which the employee is free to engage in
personal activities" during his/her "on call" time.28
Prior to communications devices such as pagers, cell phones and
23. See Grossenbacher,supra, note 14. Of course, it does not matter whether the employee
performs work on company issued equipment or their own. The issue is whether or not the work
was performed.
24. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Keeping Track of Wages: The U.S. Labor
available
at
for
That!
(May
9,
2011),
Department
Has
an
App
http://www.dol.gov/opalmedia/press/whd/WHD20110686.htm.
25. Id.
26. "Time spent at home on call may or may not be compensable depending on whether the
restrictions placed on the employee preclude using the time for personal pursuits." 29 C.F.R. §
553.221(d) (2011). "Whether time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the
employee's is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case." Ingram v. Cnty. of
Bucks, 144 F.3d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133
(1944)); see also Owens v. Local No. 169 Ass'n of W.Pulp & Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 350
(9th Cir. 1992).
27. Berry v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 1994); see Owens, 971 F.2d at
350 ("facts may show that the employee was 'engaged to wait,' which is compensable, or they may
show that the employee 'waited to be engaged,' which is not compensable."); Moon v. Kwon, 248
F. Supp. 2d 201, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Time that an employee spends waiting for work
assignments is compensable if the waiting time is spent 'primarily for the benefit of the employer
and his business."); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944); Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec.
Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2000); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 810 (11th
Cir. 1992); Bumette v. Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Ga. 2004); 29 C.F.R. §
553.221(d).
28. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180; Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 936 (9th
Cir. 2004). On-call time is compensable if it "is so restricted that it interferes with personal
pursuits." Ingram, 144 F.3d at 268; see also 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(c) ("Time spent away from the
employer's premises under conditions that are so circumscribed that they restrict the employee from
effectively using the time for personal pursuits also constitutes compensable hours of work"). The
other predominant factor to be considered is any relevant agreement(s) between employer and
employee. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180; Brigham, 357 F.3d at 936.
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PDAs, being "on call" often meant staying home to wait for a call to
come to work. Modem communications technologies, however, enable
employees to more freely engage in personal activities away from their
office or home yet still be easily contacted by the employer should the
"on call" need arise. This eases the restrictions on employees and may
result in an ultimate determination that an employee is not so restricted
that his/her "on call" time is compensable.29 Without this liberating
technology, on-call employees would be (and used to be) "effectively
tethered to their homes." 30 "Of course, an employee need not 'have
substantially the same flexibility or freedom as he would if not on call,
else all or almost all on-call time would be working time, a proposition
that the settled case law and the administrative guidelines clearly
reject."' 3 1
C. Telecommuting
As technology has advanced, telecommuting has become an
increasingly easy and efficient option for many employers and
employees.
Software such as LogMeln and GoToMyPC allow
employees seamless access to their work computers (and the office
network/database) from the comfort of their homes, without the hassle of
a commute.32 These advances, however, have created new problems for
employers. As explained above, an employer's obligation to keep
accurate records of hours worked is not dependent upon where the work

29. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184 (concluding that the "use ofpagers eases restrictions while on-call
and permits [plaintiffs] to more easily pursue personal activities"); Owens, 971 F.2d at 351; Ingram,
144 F.3d at 268; Cannon v. Vineland Hous. Auth., 627 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.N.J. 2008) ("an
employee's capacity to carry a pager and leave home weighs in favor of finding his on-call waiting
time non-compensable"); Henry v. Med-Staff, Inc., No. SA CV 05-603 DOC ANX, 2007 WL
1998653, *11 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2007) ("Cell phones likewise ease restrictions, by freeing
employees to travel wherever they wish during on-call assignments as long as their destinations
have cell phone reception . . . [which] weighs against compensating on-call time. . .
30. See Brigham, 357 F.3d at937.
31. Id. at 936; Owens, 971 F.2d at 350-51. The U.S. Dep't of Labor's (DOL) Field
Operations Handbook addresses "on-call" employees required to remain at home. In that context,
the DOL "will accept any reasonable agreement of the parties for determining the number of hours
worked." WAGE AND HOUR DIv., U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, § 3 1bl4
(2000), available at http://www.dol.gov.whd/FOH/FOHCh3 I.pdf. In addition to payment for time
actually worked, such agreement should provide for "some allowance for the restriction on the
employee's freedom to engage in personal activities . .. ." Id.
32. See About Us, LOGMEIN, https://secure.logmein.com/about/aboutus.aspx (last visited
Apr.
15,
2013);
How
it
Works,
GoToMYPC,
http://www.gotomypc.com/remoteaccess/remote-access (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
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is performed.33 While computer software allows employers to keep
track of when employees login and logout, employers must still be able
to account for any time the employee worked while logged-out. Thus, it
is imperative that employers have a clear policy with respect to hours
worked by non-exempt telecommuters (e.g., telecommuters must fill out
and sign daily time sheets).
In addition, for a telecommuting employee, employers should
consider whether he or she will be working on company issued, or
personal, equipment in performing job responsibilities. If using personal
equipment, issues such as ownership of work product, employer
confidentiality and privacy arise when business records are created on,
maintained on and/or accessed through the employee's home
computer.34 Even where company equipment is used, since the
workspace is now in the employee's home, a lack of appropriate
safeguards may allow non-employees to have access to an employer's
proprietary information.3 5
The federal government's Guide to Telework in the Federal
Government, which was created for federal employees, is instructive on
these issues, albeit not specifically applicable to private employers. The
Guide requires that employees "take responsibility for the security of the
data and other information they handle while teleworking," and enter
into a written agreement and participate in an interactive telework
training program.36
III. THE NEW FRONTIER IN DISCRIMINATION AND
HARASSMENT CASES: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
Federal, state and local laws prohibit discrimination and harassment
in the workplace.37 These prohibitions are not new, given statutes that
go back to the mid 1960s. What is new, however, is the type of conduct

33. See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
34. Jeff Tenenbaum,
Telecommuting Employees, EXEMPT, (June
http://www.exemptmagazine.com/article/detail/telecommuting-employees-4324.
35. Id.
36.

14,

2012),

OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., GUIDE TO TELEWORK IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 27-28

(2011), http://www.telework.gov/guidance-and legislation/telework guide/telework-guide.pdf.
37. Federal law protects employees from discrimination based upon protected characteristics
such as age, citizenship, sex, pregnancy, military/veteran status, race/color, religion, disability,
predisposing genetic characteristics, and national origin. Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006); see also N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW § 291(1) (McKinney 2010).
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that is increasingly creating employer liability.38
Specifically, the same modem communications technology that
improves connectivity and productivity has also created potential
liabilities for employers. First, as technology has become more
sophisticated, there has been a concomitant increase in the potential for
inappropriate communications by employees whether through text
messages, email, social media or other forms of technology.3 9 Second,
the vast amount of information available to employers without
restriction via the internet has created opportunity for claims of
discrimination that did not exist before these technological
advancements.40
A. Relaxed andDangerous Communications
Some commentators espouse that the ease of electronic
communication diminishes beneficial inhibitions and that employees
may become less diligent about treating electronic exchanges as business
communications. 4 1 As a result, people tend to say things they would not
ordinarily say. "Cyberspace gives people more than an illusion of

38. This liability can extend past discrimination and harassment cases. In one case in
Louisiana, an employer was held vicariously liable for a car accident caused by its employee (a
traveling sales manager). Ellender v. Neff Rental, Inc., 965 So.2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 2007). The
employee was on a business call on his cell phone while driving and the employer had no policy or
practice prohibiting cell phone usage while driving. Id. at 900-02; see also Buchanan v. Vowell, 926
N.E.2d 515, 517-18, 521-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (liability found against driver of car following
other car that struck pedestrian where the drivers were speaking to one another by cell phone-and
were inebriated-when the accident occurred); Ward v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. CIV. 08-4022, 2008
WL 5101996 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 1,2008) (alleged defamation based on statements made in a blog).
39. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 542-44 (N.J. 2000) (sexual harassment
based on web forum postings); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 00-12143,
2002 WL 974676, (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (hostile environment based on sexually explicit e-mails);
Ward, 2008 WL 5101996 (alleged defamation based on statements made in a blog); Complaint at 23, Guardian Civic League, Inc. v. Phila. Police Dep't, No. 2:09-cv-03148 -CMR (E.D. Pa. July 15,
2009) (No. 09-3148), available at http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-07-15Guradian%20Complaint.pdf (alleged hostile environment based on racially offensive web postings).
40. Social Media and the Workplace: Managing the Risks, JACKSON LEWIS, 3 (2010),
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/media/pnc/3/media. 1033.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
41. "Due to the lack of social and physical cues online, people are less aware, and therefore
less considerate about the other person's reaction." Larry Keller, Cyberbullies Lurking in the
Workplace,

HUM.

RESOURCE

EXECUTIVE

ONLINE

(Nov.

21,

2012),

http://www.hronline.com/iRE/view/story/jhtml?id= 534354631 (quoting Carolyn Axtell, senior
lecturer at the University of Sheffield's Institute of Work Psychology). "I see entire cases built on
email correspondence, in large part because people don't take it as seriously as written
correspondence." Dan Goodin, Email Still Dangerous in Business, CNET NEWS (Jan. 20, 1998),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-207240.html (quoting attorney Russ Elmer).
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protection.. . . It allows for false fronts, a false bravado .... ' 2
In the course of litigation, electronic mail (or other forms of
electronic communications) often contains admissions that in past years
would have been nearly impossible to discover or corroborate.4 3 Before
the popularity of electronic communications, similar communications
would have been almost entirely oral, delivered in person or by
telephone, and would generally not have been preserved or retrievable.
The "durable record" provided by electronic communications stands in
sharp contrast.44
As a practical matter, potential electronic evidence is often
attainable whether through a search of hard drives, backup media or
otherwise and even conventionally deleted material is generally
recoverable with sufficient technical prowess.4 5 Even after conventional
deletion, "data contained in the [deleted] file remains on the hard drive
until it is overwritten. Theoretically, this data could remain on the hard
drive forever." 4 6
To complicate employment litigation further,
investigations that include e-mail and other electronic communications
"rapidly become open-ended because there's such a huge quantity of
information available and it's so easily searchable."47
42. Frank Bruni, Our HardDrives, Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES (Nov. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/opinion/sunday/Bruni-Our-Hard-Drives-Ourselves.html;
see
generally State v. Patino, No. Pl-10-1155A (Sup.Ct. R.I. Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http//www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/decisions/10-1 155.pdf
(granting
motion to suppress text message evidence obtained without a search warrant).
43. See Goodin, supra note 41 ("In the litigation environment, it is often electronic mail that
contains the most damning admissions.") (quoting David H. Kramer, internet law attorney).
44. See Bruni, supra note 42 ("In lieu of eavesdroppers whom he could have disputed, he had
digital footprints that he couldn't deny, and they traced a path ... to political ruin.") (discussing
former Congressman Anthony Weiner).
45. See Tara Taghizadeh, What Really Happens When You Press 'Delete', AOL DISCOVER,
http://daol.aol.com/articles/what-is-delete (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
46. John Mallery, Secure File Deletion: Fact or Fiction?, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING
RooM,
4
(last
updated
June
12,
2006),
http://www.sans.org/reading room/whitepapers/incident/secure-file-deletion-fact-fiction631.
Although there are methods to delete information securely from a computer's hard drive, they are
rather complex and not commonly used in the ordinary course of business. See id. at 7-9; Wenner
Media LLC v. N. & Shell N. Am. Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 1286, 2005 WL 323727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2005) (detailing the failed efforts of defendant in trying to permanently delete e-mails from
company system).
47. Scott Shane, Online Privacy Issue Is Also in Play in PetraeusScandal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/l1/14/us/david-petraeus-case-raises-concems-about13,
americans-privacy.html?_r-0 (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.C.) Electronic discovery has become so vast that
studies estimate that litigants spend between $1.2 billion and $2.8 billion annually on electronic
discovery. Brian Dalton, Letters From LegalTech: The Thrills of E-Discovery, ABOVE THE LAW,
(Jan. 31, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2013/01/letter-from-legaltech-the-thrills-of-
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Court cases in the employment context hinging on the content of email or other types of electronic messages are numerous. For example,
in Virola v. XO Commc'ns, Inc.,48 the court denied the employer's
motion for summary judgment.49 In finding that the plaintiffs had raised
a triable issue of fact as to whether they were subjected to a hostile work
environment based on sex, the court relied upon emails to one of the
plaintiffs asking what she was wearing, telling her to stop "bsing" like a
woman, and suggesting that they go to strip club.so
B. To Look or Not to Look?
Without question, employers can learn a great deal of information
by reviewing a job applicant's social media presence. Social media
affords employers the opportunity to acquire information that would
have been virtually impossible to ascertain in the past. Not surprisingly,
using social media as a recruiting tool to research candidates has become

e-discovery. In fact, electronic discovery has taken a prominent role in all federal litigation since
Judge Shira A. Scheindlin's landmark decisions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC and Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC. These decisions set the framework for parties' electronic discovery obligations
as well as how costs should be allocated. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Subsequent to
Judge Scheindlin's decisions, on December 1, 2006, FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37 and 45 were
amended.
The amendments, amongst other things, codified Zubulake, explicitly added
"electronically stored information" (ESI) as its own category under Rule 26(a), placed a greater
burden on parties to meet and confer regarding e-discovery and required counsel to ensure that
litigation holds and data destruction policies are defensible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37
and 45. See generally Best Practices in E-Discovery in New York State and FederalCourts, Report
of the E-Discovery Committee of the Commercial and FederalLitigation Section of the New York
(July
2011),
N.Y.
ST.
B.
ASS'N
State
Bar
Association,
Federal
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Commercial-and
LitigationHome&Template=CM/ContentDisplay.cfim&ContentlD=58331, for additional guidance
on electronic discovery.
48. No. 02-CV-5056, 2008 WL 1766601 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008).
49.

Id at *1,*17.

50. Id. at *9. Other examples of cases in which electronically stored information played a
pivotal role are abundant. See e.g. DeCurtis v. Upward Bound Int'l, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5378, 2012
WL 4561127 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (rejecting supervisor's denial of sexual harassment
based on e-mail evidence to the contrary); Smith v. Reg'1 Plan Assoc., No. 10 Civ. 5857, 2011 WL
4801522 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) (racial harassment claim supported by e-mail evidence);
D'Angelo v. World Wrestling Entm't, Inc., 3:08-CV-1548, 2010 WL 4226479 at *4 (D. Conn. Oct.
18, 2010) (defendant did "not cite a case, and the court has not located one, where a court
disregarded sexual harassment because of the media (sic) used to convey it."); Wenner Media LLC.,
2005 WL 323727 at *4 -*5 (granting temporary restraining order to enforce a non-competition
provision where efforts to delete incriminating e-mails had failed); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs.,
Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D.P.R. 2010) (in assessing plaintiff's claim of a racially hostile work
environment the court considered a Facebook comment that a co-worker directed at plaintiff).
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a modem phenomenon."
However, when an employer learns information that it is not legally
permitted to have, problems arise. Since employers are not permitted to
discriminate on the basis of an applicant's protected characteristics (i.e.,
age, race, gender, etc.), the law prohibits various pre-employment
inquiries that might lead to an employer acquiring impermissible
information. 52 An employer may not make inquiries such as "do you
wish to be addressed as Miss or Mrs.?" or "what religious holidays do
you observe?"5 3
While it is not unlawful for an employer to search for public
information about a candidate through social media, that exercise
potentially uncovers, even unintentionally, information that the
employer is not legally permitted to utilize when making decisions. 54
For example, assume a particular applicant has posted to a Facebook
page news of her pregnancy which was (properly) not discussed during
her job interview. If a hiring manager "googles" the applicant in an
effort to learn more and stumbles upon this knowledge, his decisionmaking becomes potentially tainted. While his search in the first
instance is not unlawful, if the applicant is not hired it will be that much
more difficult to convince a trier of fact that the information about the
applicant's pregnancy was not a factor in the decision."
Along similar lines, some employers had started to require that
applicants disclose usernames and passwords for the social networking

51. As of March 2013, Facebook had one billion monthly active users. Facebook Newsroom
Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http:/newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited May 10, 2013). A 2012
study conducted by Jobvite concluded, "nearly 3 out of 4 hiring managers and recruiters check
candidates' social profiles - 48% always do so, even if they are not provided." Jobvite Social
Recruiting Survey Finds Over 90% ofEmployers Will Use Social Recruiting in 2012, JOBVITE (July
9, 2012), http://www.recruiting.jobvite.com/company/press-releases/2012/jobvite-social-recruitingsurvey-2012/.
52.

EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N., PROHIBITED EMPLOYMENT POLICES/PRACTICES,

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/index.cfn (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); see also N.Y. STATE Div.
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES, 11-12 (Dec. 2004),
http://www.nylaborandemploymentlawreport.com/uploads/file/Recommendations%20on%2OEmplo
yment%20Inquiries.pdf
53. N.Y. STATE Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 52, at 11-12.
54. See C. Reilly Larson, EEOC Lawyer Advised Careful Navigation of Issues in the
Workplace, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.bna.com/eeoc-lawyer-advisesn17179869380/.
55. Employers that choose to use social media to research applicants would be wise to
implement screening protocols such that those who conduct the searches are not the same managers
making employment decisions. Employers should also carefilly consider and delineate the
legitimate non-discriminatory business information that is sought by the search to be conducted by
approved screeners.
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sites in which they participate so that employers could conduct research
about their potential new hire. However, in response to a general
outcry that these types of requirements invaded aspects of privacy, these
practices have been attacked. In March 2012, Erin Egan, Chief Privacy
Officer, Policy, for Facebook issued a statement admonishing employers
for asking prospective (or actual) employees to reveal their passwords
suggesting that such a practice "undermines the privacy expectations and
the security of both the user and the user's friends."5 Several states
have enacted legislation which in varying forms prohibits employers
from requesting passwords as a condition to obtaining or retaining
employment.
IV. A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: MONITORING
EMPLOYEE TECHNOLOGY
With thirty years of advances in communications technology have
come complications with respect to traditional notions of employee
privacy. From telephone calls to social media sites, employers have the
technical capability to monitor a multitude of employee
communications.
However, whether such monitoring is lawful
implicates fact intensive notions of employee privacy.
Perfectly clear lines have yet to be been drawn in this continually
evolving area of law. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in City

56.

See Marisa Taylor, Montana Town Stops Asking Applicants for Facebook Login,WALL

ST. J.BLOG (June 23, 2009, 8:13 AM), http://www.blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/06/23/montana-townstops-asking-for-facebook-logins/. Similar concerns were addressed by the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey in a case involving current employees and their online
activities. See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1-2 (D.N.J.
July 25, 2008). See infra Part IV.C. for further discussion on employer surveillance of employee
social media.
57. Erin Egan, Protecting Your Passwords and Your Privacy, FACEBOOK (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-and-privacy/protecting-your-passwords-and-your-

privacy/326598317390057. Shortly, thereafter the Password Protection Act of 2012 was introduced
inCongress which would have prohibited employers from compelling access to on-line information.
See Password Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2012); Password Protection Act of
2012, S. 3074, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). The legislation was not passed. See H.R. 5684 (112th):
Password Protection Act of 2012, GovTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5684
(last visited May 10, 2013).
58. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, during 2012, six states
enacted legislation prohibiting such conduct by employers (specifically, California, Delaware,
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey) while multiple other states have similar legislation
pending. Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords: 2012 Legislation, NAT'L
CONE. ST. LEGIs. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-tosocial-media-passwords.aspx.
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of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior. . . . At present, it is uncertain how
workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve. .. .
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so
one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar
devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own.59
Where disputes arise, the issue generally boils down to whether the
employee had a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 60 Yet, what
constitutes an employee's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is not
clear cut and "must be addressed on a case-by-case basis."
Clearly
articulated and communicated employer policies often become the focal
point of the analysis as such policies have been found to "shape the
reasonable expectations of their employees."62
Therefore, as
59. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010). Quon involved a public
employee and whether his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the City's monitoring of
text messages. See id. at 2624. While Quon may be viewed as limited to its facts, the Court
provided a roadmap to relevant considerations in determining whether an employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and further stated that its reasoning would apply in the privateemployer context. See id. at 2633. Interestingly, the Court observed that some states have "passed
statutes requiring employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic
communications." Id. at 2630 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2005) and CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-48d (West 2003)).
60. There are some statutory privacy protections, although they pre-date the explosion of
modem communications technology. For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 ("ECPA")-which includes the "Wiretap Act" and the Stored Communications Act
("SCA")-protects the privacy of electronic communications. The Wiretap Act protects against the
interception of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2006). The SCA, on the other
hand, protects against the unauthorized access to electronic communications while in storage. See
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). However, the ECPA does provide circumstances in which employers can
legitimately retrieve electronic communications without violating the law. See 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(d). A party's explicit or implied consent is a defense. See id.; Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d
271, 281 (1st Cir. 1993). Additional defenses include the "ordinary course of business" exception
which requires that an interception be "(1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine and (3) with
notice." Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Friedman, 300
F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2002); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a); cf Briggs infra note 65.
61. City of Ontario, 130 S.Ct. at 2628.
62. Id. at 2630; see also State v. Young, 974 So.2d 601, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (lack
of applicable policy was factor in finding a reasonable expectation of privacy); Dukes v. ADS
Alliance Data Sys., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-00784, 2006 WL 3366308, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2006)
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demonstrated below, best practice dictates active and full
communication with employees with respect to expectations of privacy
and employee monitoring.
A. Telephone Monitoring
The genesis of employee monitoring is found in old-fashioned
eavesdropping.
Albeit using what seems today to be antiquated
technology, consider the employer that chose (or chooses) to monitor
employee telephone calls. Call centers and other phone based customer
service businesses established entire protocols for monitoring phone
calls as a tool for managing employee performance. One critical issue in
evaluating whether an employee's privacy has been breached is whether
the employee consented to having his communications monitored, either
expressly or by implication.
The specific terms of an employer's
policy (together with its methods of communication) are central to this
evaluation. For example, while agreeing to a policy stating that calls are
monitored with an aim toward improving employees' telephone skills
and job performance may be consent for the monitoring of business
calls, it is not implied consent to the monitoring of personal calls.64 A
number of judicial decisions in different jurisdictions bear this out.65

(reasonable expectation of privacy found where scope of monitoring policy was limited); Muick v.
Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (clear employer policy that it could inspect
company-issued laptop computers "destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy"); Shefts v.
Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 631 (C.D. Ill. 2010); Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot
Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
63. In addition to the privacy concerns implicated by monitoring phone calls, there are
criminal statutes that prohibit the unauthorized interception of telephone calls. These laws vary by
state, with some states permitting such eavesdropping or wiretapping with the consent of one party
to the communication and others requiring the consent of both parties. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-570d (West 2005) (two party consent); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (West Supp.
2012) (two party consent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-4(d) (West 2011) (one party consent); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 250.00-.05 (McKinney 2008) (one party consent).
64. Dukes, 2006 WL 3366308, at *14. One court has held that a general policy that
equipment provided by the employer may not be used for personal use does not provide notice
sufficient to find consent to the monitoring of personal calls. Adams, 250 F.3d at 984 (employerissued pagers).
65. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cit. 1992),where the owners of a liquor
store, suspicious that their employee plaintiff had been involved in the theft of $16,000, installed
recording equipment that automatically recorded all telephone conversations to and from the store.
Informing plaintiff that they might monitor the phone "in order to cut down on personal calls," the
owners listened to the entirety of twenty-two hours of taped conversations involving plaintiff. Id. at
1156. While learning nothing about the theft, they learned that plaintiff had violated a store policy
and subsequently fired her. Id. There was no consent defense because the owners did not clearly
inform plaintiff that they would be monitoring her calls, only that they might do so. Id. at 1157.
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B. MonitoringE-Mail and Internet Usage
Employees using company equipment may have a difficult time
establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in their use of such
equipment, particularly where the company has a policy on point. Said
another way, the reasonableness of an employee's expectation of privacy
can be severely curtailed by an employer's clear policy allowing for
monitoring. 6 As one Court articulated, whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to communications sent
or received on the company system "depends upon whether [the
employer] had a policy in place regarding the monitoring of such
communications, as well as whether Plaintiff was aware that [defendant]
or others at [employer] may be monitoring his activities."
Some courts have even held that when an employee communicates
with his/her lawyer using the company computer, the attorney-client
privilege is lost.6 8 However, if such privileged communications were
Moreover, while the owners may have had a legitimate interest in monitoring calls in connection
with their suspicions about theft or abuse of personal call privileges, "the scope of the interception
in this case takes us well beyond the boundaries of the ordinary course of business." Id. at 1158; see
also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983) ("a personal call may be
intercepted in the ordinary course of business to determine its nature but never its contents.");
Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d. 914, 923 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (once the
eavesdropping employees determined that plaintiffs call was personal (and not with a minor), "they
had an obligation to cease listening and hang up."); Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420
n.9 (5th Cir. 1980) (monitoring of business call based on suspicion of disclosure of confidential
information is within the ordinary course of business).
66. See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559-60 ("Courts have routinely found
that employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace computers, where the
employer has a policy which clearly informs employees that company computers cannot be used for
personal e-mail activity, and that they will be monitored."). While the trend in the case law
supports the importance of clearly articulated employer policies, an employer's policy is not always
determinative. One early e-mail decision held that there was no expectation of privacy in use of the
employer's e-mail system even where the employer "repeatedly assured its employees .. .that all email communications would remain confidential and privileged" and that "e-mail communications
could not be intercepted and used by [the employer] against its employees as grounds for
termination or reprimand." Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also
People v. Klapper, 28 Misc. 3d 225, 226 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (finding no expectation of privacy in
a criminal context stating "It is today's reality that a reasonable expectation of Intemet privacy is
lost, upon your affirmative keystroke. Compound that reality with an employee's use of his or her
employer's computer for the transmittal of non-business-related messages, and the technological
reality meets the legal roadway, which equals the exit of any reasonable expectation of, or right to,
privacy in such communications."); Fazio v. Temp. Excellence Inc., No. A-5441-08T3, 2012 WL
300634, at *13 (N.J. Sup.Ct. Feb. 2, 2012) (no expectation of privacy even without email policy).
67. Shefts, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
68. See Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 17 Misc. 3d 934, 938 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2007) (noting
scope of defendant's e-mail policy); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005); cf Fazio, 2012 WL 300634, at *13 (privilege lost even without email policy).
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sent or received with reasonable steps taken to keep them from the
employer (e.g., through a private e-mail account that was merely
accessed through company-provided equipment), the privilege may
survive.
In certain circumstances, an employer may have an affirmative duty
to investigate employee e-mails. For example, in one case, in response
to a complaint by a co-worker, an employer fired certain employees after
finding sexually explicit e-mails in their work e-mail folders that had
been exchanged on the company system. 70 The court recognized no
reasonable expectation of privacy because the allegedly sexually explicit
e-mails were voluntarily sent to co-workers on the company's e-mail
system.71 The court went further however, and stated that even with a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the employer's "legitimate business
interest in protecting its employees from harassment in the workplace
would likely trump plaintiffs' privacy interests.. .. [O]nce defendant
received a complaint about the plaintiffs' sexually explicit e-mails, it
was required by law to commence an investigation." 72
C. MonitoringEmployee Use of Social Media

Uncertainty in the law is particularly evident in the context of
employee use of social media. As explained by one court, "[p]rivacy in
social networking is an emerging, but underdeveloped, area of case
law.",7 Some employers have attempted to monitor the online social
media activities of their employees. While courts have held that there is
69. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010); Pure Power
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (employee had reasonable expectation of privacy in personal
email stored on commercial server that was password protected notwithstanding employee access
while at work).
70. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL
974676, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
71. Id. at *2. The defendant company had a policy in place stating that "there may be
business or legal situations that necessitate company review of E-mail messages and other
documents." Id. at *1.
72. Id. at *2; see also Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 552 (N.J. 2000) ("employers
do have a duty to take effective measures to stop co-employee harassment when the employer
knows or has reason to know that such harassment is part of a pattern of harassment that is taking
place in the workplace and in settings that are related to the workplace."). The same principles have
been applied with respect to monitoring employee Internet use. See Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d
1156, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) ("an employer who is on notice that one of its
employees is using a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has a
duty to investigate the employee's activities and to take prompt and effective action to stop the
unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent third-parties.").
73. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 2012).
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no reasonable expectation of privacy as to materials posted to publicly
available sites, 7 4 problems arise when employers attempt to look behind
password protected walls. Courts have recognized an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy where access to the employee's
communication is not public and is otherwise password protected.
In one such case, a restaurant employee initiated a group discussion
on MySpace designed to "vent about any BS we deal with out [sic] work
without any outside eyes spying in on us." 7 6 A restaurant manager
learned of the discussion group and asked an employee-member to
provide him with the password so he could gain access-which the
employee provided.
Management consequently fired two plaintiffs
who had contributed "offensive" comments.7 ' The Court denied the
employer's summary judgment motion finding that if the employee gave
management his password "under duress, then the Defendants were not
'authorized"' to access the site.
V. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT MEETS SOCIAL
MEDIA
Since the advent of social media (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter,
Instagram), many employees utilize such media to stay connected with
friends, family and even business contacts.80 Unlike e-mail or instant
74. Id. at 373; see, e.g., U.S. v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R, 2002) ("it
strikes the Court as obvious that a claim to privacy is unavailable to someone who places
information on an indisputably, public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any measures to
protect the information.").
75. See Ehling, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 374. The Ehling Court ultimately determined that "given
the open-ended nature of the case law[,]" the plaintiff "may have had a reasonable expectation" that
a posting limited to her Facebook friends "would remain private[.]" Id.
76. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25,
2008). The discussion thread included sexual remarks about management and customers, jokes
about customer service and quality specifications and (supposedly joking) references to violence
and illegal drug use. Id. at *2.
77. See id.at *1.
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. at *4; see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). In
Konop, an airline pilot started his own secure website "where he posted bulletins critical of his
employer, its officers, and the incumbent union" and encouraged employees "to consider alternative
union representation." Id. at 872. Access to the site required a user name and password. Id. Upon
obtaining access to the site through an employee, an airline Vice President threatened to sue
plaintiff for defamation based on the website postings. Id. at 873. The employer's access was
unauthorized because the employee who shared his login information with the Vice President was
not a "user" of the service and therefore could not authorize such access. See id. at 880 (holding that
while the employee had been granted access, he had not actually "used" the site).
80. See Cheryl Conner, Employees Really Do Waste Time at Work, Part II, FORBES (Nov. 15,
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messaging, which generally are direct personal communications, social
media posts are often entirely public, but at a minimum shared
simultaneously with large groups of people.81 Employees, particularly
younger employees, communicate electronically with increasing
frequency; at the same time, employers have a strong interest in
maintaining their business reputations and protecting confidential
information.82 As a result, many employers have been compelled to
address problems that could not have been envisioned before social
media and to develop parameters for their employees' social media use
and even whole policies dedicated to such usage.83
However, just as verbal communication is protected under the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act"), so is electronic
Any form of
communication, regardless of the audience.
communication is legally protected if it is concerted (meaning that two
employees act together or one employee solicits others) and the subject
matter is protected (meaning that it concerns wages, hours, working
conditions or terms and conditions of employment).84 When employees
gripe about how much they are paid and agree that their employer is a
tightwad, they have a legally protected right to hold that conversation,
whether it happens in person, on the phone, or on the internet, and even
if the rest of the world is privy to the communication. Any attempt to
stop that communication or to punish an employee for it would violate
the NLRA.85 Moreover, this analysis applies both to union and nonunion employers alike.

2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2012/11/15/employees-really-dowaste-time-at-work-part-ii/.
81. See Melissa Venable, The Public Nature of Social Media Participation,
ONLINECOLLEGE.ORG (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.onlinecollege.org/2013/02/25/the-public-naturesocial-media-participation/.
82. See Joe Sharkey, E-Mail Saves Time, but Being There Says More, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
Employee Online Social
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/business/26road.html?;
Networking: Advantages and Risks for Employers, THoRP, REED & ARMSTRONG (Sept. 10, 2010),
[hereinafter Employee
http://www.thorpreed.com/secondary.aspx?id-44&p-0&LibrarylD-208
Online Social Networking].
83. See Employee Online SocialNetworking, supra note 82.
84. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added). Section 8(a)(1) goes on to provide that
"[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
85. Design Tech. Grp., LLC, No. 20-CA-35511, 2012 WL 1496201 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 27,
2012).
86. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 9 (1962); see also NLRB v.
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Social media policies in which employers dictate what employees
can communicate electronically are subject to the same scrutiny by the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")." If they inhibit or prevent
protected communications, they will run afoul of the Act.
Demonstrating the significance of these issues to the agency, the Acting
General Counsel ("AGC") for the NLRB, issued three detailed
memoranda directly on point between August 2011 and May 2012.89
In September 2012, the NLRB issued its first two decisions
addressing employer social media policies. 90 Until then, the only
decisions that had issued on the subject were by Administrative Law
Judges,9' who make recommended findings and conclusions to the
NLRB, which can adopt or reject the recommendations. Both of these
cases challenged facially neutral employer policies that the Board held
inhibited "concerted activity" because an employee could "reasonably
construe" those policies to restrict their right to talk about wages, hours
and working conditions.92
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976) ("there can be little doubt that the protection
afforded to concerted activities under the NLRA applies equally to workers in unionized or in nonunionized firms.").
87. See Mark Robbins & Jennifer Mora, The NLRB and Social Media: General Counsel's
New Report
Offers
Employers Some
Guidance, LITTLER
(Sept.
9,
2011),
http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/nlrb-and-social-media-general-counsels-newreport-offers-employers-som.
88. See id.
89. See generally Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel Representative Div. of
Operations-Mgmt., OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL

MEDIA CASES (Aug. 18, 2011); Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel Representative
Div. of Operations-Mgmt., OM 12-31, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Jan. 24, 2012); Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel
Representative Div. of Operations-Mgmt., OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (May 30, 2012) [hereinafter OM-1259].
While these
memoranda are not Board precedent, Fun Striders, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 520, 520 n.1 (July 10,
1980), the AGC decides when and under what circumstances they will issue complaints against
employers and these memoranda show the parameters of what the AGC believes lawful activity to
be. See Robbins & Mora, supra note 87.
90. See generally Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (Sept. 7, 2012); Karl
Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Sept. 28, 2012).
91. See, e.g., Design Tech. Grp., LLC, supra note 85, at 1; Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,
359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 1 (Dec. 14, 2012).
92. See generally cases cited supranote 90. It is worth noting that President Obama's 2012
appointments and one 2011 appointment to the NLRB were recently were found to be invalid. See
Canning v. N.L.R.B., Nos. 12-115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024, at *507, *513-14 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
2013); N.L.R.B. v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, Nos. 12-1027, 12-1936, 2013 WL
2099742, at *30 (3d Cir. May 16, 2013). The District of Columbia's decision is being challenged to
the Supreme Court but if it is upheld, all NLRB decisions issued in 2012 would be invalidated.
Jeremiah L. Hart, Noel Canningv. NLRB: The Decision, Its PotentialImpact, and the Future of the
4,
2013),
Board,
BAKER
HOSTETLER
(Feb.
National
Labor
Relations
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In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., the employer's "Courtesy" policy
prohibited, inter alia, being "disrespectful or us[ing] profanity or any
other language which injures the image or reputation" of the employer.93
The NLRB found that this policy violated the NLRA because employees
could reasonably construe its broad prohibitions as encompassing
section 7 activity. 94 Similarly, in Costco Wholesale Corp., the NLRB
found unlawful a policy prohibiting, inter alia, statements "that damage
the Company, defame any individual or damage any person's
reputation . . . ."9.
As explained by the Board in Knauz, certain types of employer
policies violate Section 8 of the NLRA where the rule "reasonably tends
to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights." 9 6 "If the rule
explicitly restricts Section 7 rights, it is unlawful." 97 If it does not, it is
still unlawful if "(1) employees would reasonably construe the language
to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response
to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise
of Section 7 rights."98 The Acting General Counsel, who again, decides
what cases go to a hearing, would go further and would allege as
unlawful any policy that does not "clarify to employees that the rule
does not restrict Section 7 rights."99
This means, for example, that restrictions on the disclosure of

http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/noel-canning-v-nlrb-the-decision-its-potential-impact-and-thefuture-of-the-national-labor-relations-board-2-4-2013/. The Third Circuit's decision is also likely to
be challenged. If it is upheld, certain NLRB decisions going back as far as August of 2011 could
also be invalidated. Ronald Meisburg, Third CircuitHolds Former MLRB Member Becker's Recess
Appointment Invalid, Vacates NLRB Decision Made In August, 2011, PROSKAUER (May 17, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/third-circuit-holds-former-nlrb-member-b-70330/.
93. KarlKnauz Motors, Inc. 358 N.L.R.B. at 1.
94. Id In addition to striking down the employer's courtesy policy, the NLRB in the Knauz
case upheld an employee's termination based on his mocking Facebook posting (about an auto
accident at the car dealership) which was "neither protected nor concerted." Id. at 10-11. Although
the employee had also made other postings that arguably included protected activity, the NLRB
determined that the termination was premised upon the unprotected postings. See id. at 11.
95. Costco, 358 N.L.R.B. at 1. A more recent NLRB decision found that an employer's
termination of five employees pursuant to a "zero tolerance" policy against harassment and bullying
violated the employees' section 7 rights where the employees had posted comments on Facebook
addressing a coworker's criticism of their job performance. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,
359 N.L.R.B. at 3.
96. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. at 1 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B.
824, 825 (1998)).
97. Id. (citing Lutheran Heritage Village.-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004).
98. Id. (citing LutheranHeritage, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647).
99. OM-1259, supra note 89, at 3. The AGC cautions that it is not sufficient to include a
savings clause that tells employees that nothing in the policy is intended to restrict their section 7
rights. See id at 9.
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confidential information may be unlawful unless set forth along with
"sufficient examples of prohibited disclosures ... for employees to
understand that it does not reach protected communications about
working conditions."100 This rule is premised on the fact that the NLRB
"has long recognized that the term 'confidential information,' without
narrowing its scope so as to exclude Section 7 activity, would reasonably
be interpreted to include information concerning terms and conditions of
employment."' 0' It also means that general restrictions on "offensive,
demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks" could be unlawful
because they proscribe "a broad spectrum of communications that would
include protected criticisms of the Employer's labor policies or
treatment of employees." 0 2
A rule's context is critical to determining its "reasonableness." For
example, a rule prohibiting "disparaging or defamatory comments"
about the employer was found to be unlawful. 0 3 According to the
NLRB, employees would reasonably construe it to apply to protected
criticism of an employer's labor policies or treatment of employees.104
However, a rule prohibiting statements that are "slanderous or
detrimental to" the employer that "appeared on a list of prohibited
conduct including 'sexual or racial harassment' and 'sabotage,' would
not be reasonably understood to restrict Section 7 activity." 05
As the NLRB continues its aggressive examination of social media
policies, employers are wise to scrutinize and revise their own policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advances in technology have provided today's workplace with
increasingly powerful tools to address business needs in ways that could
not have been anticipated thirty years ago. That very same technology,
however, has also complicated issues of legal compliance in the
workplace that similarly could not have been anticipated. As we expect
technology to continue to advance with rapid speed, these areas of law
will be called upon to adapt to the changing workplace.

100. Id. at 20.
101. Id. at 13 (citing Univ. Med. Ctr., 335 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1322 (2001)).
102. Id. at 8; see also Costco, 358 N.L.R.B. at 2 (finding unlawful a policy prohibiting the
posting of statements "that 'damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person's
reputation' . . . .").
103. OM-1259, supranote 89 at 17.
104. Id. at 17; see also KarlKnauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. at 1.
105. OM-1259, supra note 89 at 13 (citing Tradesmen Int'l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002)).
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